










REFORMING THE TAXATION OF 
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL ENTERPRISES IN EUROPE, 





CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1860 











An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




REFORMING THE TAXATION OF 
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL ENTERPRISES IN EUROPE, 





This paper investigates replacing separate taxation by consolidation and formulary 
apportionment in a Bottom-up Federation, when a multijurisdictional firm is mobile in 
various respects. The reform is decided cooperatively by all the jurisdictions or by some of 
them, while tax rates remain within the competence of each jurisdiction. The paper sets forth 
the conditions for the reform to be social welfare enhancing, while not increasing tax 
competition. Among them, the formula should emphasize criteria that the Multijurisdictional 
Enterprise cannot easily manipulate and the consolidating area should protect its capacity to 
levy taxes by adopting a crediting system, possibly extended to accrued capital gains, vis-à-
vis the rest of the world. Policy conclusions are suggested accordingly. 
JEL Code: H32, H73, H87. 







FUCaM, Catholic University of Mons 
Department of Economics and Sociology 







October 30, 2006 
This paper was prepared during a sabbatical leave from Fucam, at Queen’s University and 
CESifo. I am indebted to the Belgian FNRS for financial support, to Robin Boadway and 
CESifo for their hospitality, and to Thiess Buettner, Sam Bucovetsky, Andreas Haufler, 
Nadine Riedl, Marko Runkel, Peter Sorensen, Frans van Istendael and other participants at 
various seminars in Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, Brussels, Munich and Lexington for their 
comments and critiques. 1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by, and expects to contribute to, the present debate
on the taxation of multijurisdictional enterprises (MJE’s) in the European
Union. On the one hand, both the EU Commission (European Commission,
2001a) and the enterprises (UNICE, 2000) complain about the tax obstacles
to the operation of a true single market, including the need for MJE’s to
learn as many tax systems as there are Member States - although MJEs may
in fact beneﬁt from the strategic opportunities provided by this variety of tax
systems. On the other hand Member States are attached to their exclusive
right to decide on tax rates (a sign of their sovereignty - indeed for those in
t h eE u r o z o n et h es o l er e m a i n i n ge c o n o m i cs i g no ft h a ts o v e r e i g n t y )a n dt o
one of the basic principles of the EU, the subsidiarity principle, which implies
that as much power as possible should be kept at the lowest possible level
of government (in this case at the level of Member States rather than the
EU Commission). One way to resolve this tension might be to change the
taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises from separate accounting (SA) to
consolidation with formulary apportionment (C&FA) a reform that the EU
Commission proposed in 2001 (European Commission, 2001a; 2003). No-
tice that, throughout this paper we use the term ‘Multijurisdictional’ enter-
prise deliberately: the European Union is suﬃciently integrated for the word
‘Multinational’ no longer to be adequate, but not suﬃciently integrated to
justify the use of the word ‘Multistate’; the more neutral ‘Multijurisdictional’
seems appropriate to designate an enterprise operating in various Member
States of this bottom-up federation.
By a bottom-up federation, we mean a federation in progress, where the
centre has the power delegated by the members. To complete the explanation
of the title, "coopetition" refers to a key characteristics of that federation:
decisions as to the design of the tax system - whether or nor adopting C&FA,
and which formula to decide - have to be taken at unanimity of member
states or by a coalition of them - thus cooperatively - while the tax rates
remain within the competence of each jurisdiction and may be decided non-
cooperatively in a tax competition framework.
The reader not familiar with interjurisdictional taxation may like to know
t h a tE u r o p e a nM J E sa r en o wt a x e da c c o r d i n gt oaS As y s t e m :e a c hl e g a l
entity, or sometimes each national entity, is taxed on its own proﬁta n dt a x
relations between aﬃliates in diﬀerent jurisdictions are ruled by tax treaties
designed along the lines of the OECD model (OECD, 1996), possibly supple-
2mented by EU Directives such as the July 1990 Directive on the circulation
of dividends between parent companies. This system is typical of relations
within a network of sovereign states, each being free not only to decide on
i t so w nt a xr a t e sb u ta l s ot od e ﬁne, for example, how to compute the tax
base. Belgium, for instance, has just decided to move to an ACE system
of computing the tax base, allowing companies to oﬀset some fraction of
their equity against their corporate tax base (Gérard, 2006a,b). By contrast,
more advanced federations, such as the US and, for some taxes, Germany,
have adopted C&FA: a single tax base is ﬁr s tc o m p u t e df o ra l lt h ea ﬃliates
of the same parent company, according to a given set of tax rules. This
consolidated tax base is further distributed among the jurisdictions where
the aﬃliates operate, according to predetermined rules, in order to be taxed
by each of them at its own tax rate. Canada has adopted FA but without
consolidation across the legal entities of a group of related companies. This
combination of a single set of tax rules to compute a consolidated tax base
and tax rates decided by each jurisdiction separately appears to enable C&FA
to resolve the tension discussed above. For lessons for Europe from the US
and Canadian experiences see Hellerstein and McLure (2004), Weiner (2005)
and Martens-Weiner (2006); on the US application of the system, see also
Goolsbee and Maydew (2000).1
To explore this debate, this paper employs the following modeling strat-
egy: a single MJE and three jurisdictions playing a six-Step game in three
diﬀerent settings.
The single MJE will be, depending on the setting of the game, one-, two-
or n− degree mobile. By a n− degree mobile MJE we mean a MJE with (n+
1) characteristics (such as the geographic distribution of its investments, the
1The C&FA system, which has been extensively examined and discussed by experts
and the parties concerned, certainly has the great advantage (providing it is suﬃciently
widespread) of putting an end to a certain number of tax strategies which MJEs ﬁnd it
in their interest to practice. As shown by the seminal work of Gordon and Wilson (1986)
and the studies motivated by the planned reform in Europe – see Sorensen (2004) and
the other references at the end of this article – such a reform could, however, under some
conditions, increase tax competition between jurisdictions.. Therefore the selection of the
formula is a key political decision. The EU Commission has proposed, as an intermediate
step towards consolidation and formulary apportionment, that international compensation
of losses between companies operating in the EU and belonging to the same MJE should
be allowed. For an analysis of this issue see Gérard and Weiner (2003; 2005) and Weiner
and Gérard (2004). Notice also that this paper continues our research work on that topic,
see also Gérard (2003, 2005a,b).
3origins of its sales to ﬁn a lc u s t o m e r s ,t h ef r a c t i o no ft h eﬁnancial investment
and proﬁts channeled through a passive jurisdiction), n of which are under
its control while one is not.2
Three jurisdictions play in the game, two of them being active, and one
passive. An active jurisdiction hosts an active aﬃliate of the MJE, i.e. an
aﬃliate which actually produces and/or sells, and is a market for the MJE.
A passive jurisdiction is solely a ﬁnancial center and will not be present in
all the settings of the game; such a jurisdiction has a lower tax rate but is
deemed to be located within the EU so that it will not be considered as a
tax haven by the other two. The jurisdictions may diﬀer between each other
in terms of tax rates, size etc.
T h r e es e t t i n g sw i l lb ec o n s i d e r e d .I nt h eﬁrst one, the MJE only decides
on the distribution of its production (and thus of its investment) between
the two active jurisdictions – it is one-degree mobile – the distribution of
ﬁnal demand being given, and being satisﬁed by the local aﬃliate. However
intra-MJE trade is possible using an at arm’s length transfer price3,s ot h a t
the revenue of an aﬃliate depends on its sales both to the ﬁnal customers and
to the aﬃliate in the other jurisdiction. In a second setting, the need to sell
to the ﬁnal customers through the local aﬃliate is removed, so that it is now
possible for a given aﬃliate of the MJE to sell directly to the customers in
the territory of the other aﬃliate. The MJE then decides on the distribution
of its production and the origin of its sales – in other words it is two-degree
mobile; alternatively it could decide on a (risky) transfer price departing
from the at arm’s length one, or on a management fee or a royalty. In the
2More formally, a n-degree mobile MJE is a point in a (n +1 ) -dimension space




where x is a vector of length n of variables under the control of the ﬁrm, x0 being the
initial value of that vector, and q is the variable that the ﬁrm does not control. The ﬁrm
may decide to move to another point in that space




in order to maximize its own value V .
3In application of Oecd Model Tax Convention art. 9.1 - see OECD, 1996 - transactions
between interdependent ﬁrms have to be realized using the same price as for transactions
with unrelated parties.
4ﬁnal setting, the MJE may transfer proﬁts – up to an upper limit – to an
aﬃliate in the passive jurisdiction, gaining an additional element of mobility.4
In all these settings the tax system is deemed to obey the exemption
principle: under SA local proﬁts are taxed locally and further repatriation
to the parent company does not involve any extra tax liabilities. Moreover,
interest payments are fully deductible against the tax base of the paying
entity.
T h es i xs t e p so ft h eg a m ea r ei nl i n ew i t ht h ee v o l u t i o no ft h eE u r o p e a n
Union, the ﬁr s tt h r e ec o r r e s p o n d i n gt ot h eg a m ep l a y e du n d e rS A ,t h el a s t
three to the game under C&FA.
The ﬁrst step, in some sense, corresponds to the pre-EU state of Europe
and provides the players with an initial situation: in the two-degree mobile
setting the distribution of the investment, and thus of the production, is
determined by, say, the natural advantages that the jurisdictions have, and
the distribution of demand by the respective size of those jurisdictions. In
the second step, a single market comes into eﬀect and interjurisdictional tax
competition starts, generating a Nash equilibrium in tax rates, to which the
MJE adapts in the third step.
In the fourth Step the jurisdictions may decide to move from SA to C&FA
and, if they move, they decide on the formula. The jurisdictions remain free
to engage in further tax competition in the ﬁfth step, the MJE adapting to
that new situation in the sixth and ﬁnal step. In some sense, the fourth
step, and maybe the ﬁfth step, are today’s EU while the ﬁf t ha n ds i x t ha r e
tomorrow’s. However what will happen tomorrow might be anticipated today
in such a way that steps 4 and 5 are quasi-simultaneous: the jurisdictions
decide on the new system and possibly revise their tax rates accordingly
during the same period - in the paper we consider those steps simultaneously.
In the EU, decisions on tax matters must be adopted either unanimously
or by a number of Member States acting together in the framework of an En-
hanced Cooperation Agreement (see Bordignon and Busco, 2006). Therefore
we assume that the decision to move to C&FA and the deﬁnition of the for-
mula are either taken by all the jurisdictions cooperatively (in this we diﬀer
from Wellisch, 2004), or solely by the active ones, again acting cooperatively.
In other words, in this model, the decision as to the system – SA or
C&FA – and the formula if C&FA is taken cooperatively, while the decisions
as to the tax rates are taken non-cooperatively.
4On that last setting see also Mintz and Smart (2004).
5Some policy lessons arise from this exercise. In particular, the reform
might be supported provided that (1) the formula puts emphasis on criteria
that the ﬁrm cannot easily manipulate; (2) real investment is actually mobile;
(3) the consolidation is made compulsory within the consolidating area; and
(4) the consolidating area protects its capacity to actually levy tax by adopt-
ing a crediting system, possibly extending to accrued capital gains, vis-à-vis
the rest of the world. This last recommendation is valid even if the reform is
adopted by the entire EU, as long as the EU is not disconnected from the rest
of the world. That last remarks enlarges the scope of the paper: despite its
motivation by a possible change in the EU, it is not without interest for other
regions in the world, especially those where federation building processes are
in progress, nor for the taxation of MJE’s across the whole world.
This paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 2
considers a one-degree mobile MJE and Section 3 a two- or more- degree
mobile MJE, taking into account strategic opportunities oﬀered by the SA
tax system, and dealing successively with tax shifting and paper proﬁts,
proﬁtable detour and inter-modal ﬁnance, and with the issue of the adoption
of the reform by either the whole EU or a subset of Member States within
an Enhanced Cooperation Agreement. Conclusions and avenues for further
research are discussed in Section 4.
In addition to the contributions already mentioned, several interesting pa-
pers on related topics exist, including Eggert and Schjelderup (2003), Nielsen
et al. (2003), Pethig and Wagener (2003), Eichner and Runkel (2006) and
Riedl and Runkel (2006).
2 A one-degree mobile MJE
T h eo n e - d e g r e em o b i l eﬁrm has two characteristics observed by the players in
Step 1: on the one hand it has invested a fraction α0 of its total investment
and produces that fraction of its total production, in jurisdiction i,a n dt h e
complement 1−α0 in jurisdiction j, i and j being the two active jurisdictions;
on the other hand it needs to deliver a fraction q of its production to the
market in jurisdiction i and 1−q to the market in j. The MJE can change the
ﬁrst characteristics by moving part of its real investment from one jurisdiction
to the other, substituting α for α0. However such a move has a cost c(α).
The second characteristics is not controlled by the MJE.
6In other words the MJE is
MJE0 =( α0,q) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1]
and may decide to move to another point
MJE =( α,q) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1]
in that space in order to maximize its value, at Steps 3 and 6 of the game,
(more precisely at Step 3 under SA and at Step 6 under C&FA). As discussed
i nt h ei n t r o d u c t i o n ,t h eo n e - d e g r e em o b i l eM J Ee v o l v e si nat w o - j u r i s d i c t i o n
setting where q must be satisﬁed by the aﬃliate in i and 1 − q by its coun-
terpart in j. The retail price paid by the ﬁnal customers is denoted by p; p
is a net price in the sense that it may be regarded as a retail price net of op-
erational costs, including wage costs. Moreover intra-MJE trade is possible
and is conducted at a wholesale price pw ≤ p; the wholesale price is also a
net price which may diﬀer from the retail price to the extent that it does not
incorporate the cost of preparing the good for the ﬁnal sale. At the extreme,
both prices may be equal; otherwise the retail price is larger.
By "enough mobile" we mean that in response to a tax diﬀerential incen-
tive τj <τ i, the cost of moving real activity from jurisdiction i to jurisdcition
j ,d e n o t i n gb yc(α) - see equation (3)below - is small enough to enable the
MJE to move from α0 − q>0 to α − q<0.
Bearing this in mind we ﬁrst investigate the game under SA, then that
under C&FA, resolving backwards in both cases.
2.1 Separate Accounting
Under separate accounting, each aﬃliate of the MJE is taxed separately on its
own proﬁt. We assume that the exemption principle is at work so that proﬁt
taxed at the level of the aﬃliate in one jurisdiction is not taxed again when
distributed to the parent company - this implies that proﬁt is repatriated as
a dividend to the parent company located in i.
We resolve the game backwards. Let us thus examine Step 3 ﬁrst and
then Step 2.
2.1.1 The MJE under SA
In Step 3, the one-degree mobile ﬁrm maximizes its long run value with






− τiBi − τjBj − c(α) (1)
where
p
r is the discounted ﬂow of gross receipts, r being a discounting rate
τiBi and τjBj are tax liabilities in jurisdictions i and j respectively, and
c(α) is the cost of changing the distribution of real investment from its
initial distribution.
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which sets forth the relative emphasis of sales, q, and investment and thus



























8It turns out from the ﬁrst order condition of the maximization of equation
(1) with respect to α that the equilibrium value of that variable is
α























Replacing αq by its equilibrium value in (1), the value of the ﬁrm in terms















































2.1.2 The jurisdictions under SA
Suppose that each government maximizes a Social Welfare Function — Step
2o ft h eg a m e—d e ﬁned on the welfare of its own residents deemed to depend
on the share si of the value of the MJE, V , owned by those residents, on
the eﬀect of the investment on local employment, say wiα/r in jurisdiction i
where wi is the shadow price of hiring a worker in i (see Boadway and Bruce,
1984), and on the amount of public goods available to the residents, uiτiBi
in jurisdiction i, ui being the shadow price of public goods in jurisdiction i.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that si = sj = s ≤ 1/2; wi = wj = w
and ui = uj = u>1. Thus, for jurisdiction i,




9has to be maximized with respect to tax rate τi.


















whose slope is positive and smaller than one. In order to have positive tax
rates at Nash equilibrium, we assume that the intercept is positive. It turns















































Notice that it easy to calibrate those expressions in order to ensure that
τ
q















∝ (2q − 1)p +2( α0 − q)p
w
so that a suﬃcient condition for the tax rate in jurisdiction j to be smaller
than its counterpart in jurisdiction i is α0 >q>1/2; not surprisingly (and
in line with NEG) the larger jurisdiction in terms of domestic investment and
d e m a n di st h el e s sa g g r e s s i v ei nt e r m so ft a xr a t e s .











10Some special cases of equation (8) deserve interest. First if the govern-













so that the intercept of the reaction function is larger than in the general
case, and the equilibrium tax rate as well. Second, if the government is not
interested in the welfare of shareholders or if no shareholder is resident in

















and the intercept and equilibrium tax rate are in between the general and
Leviathan case. We see that, more than a Leviathan government, a govern-
ment committed to the welfare of the workers, and a fortiori of the share-
holders, will have an incentive to decrease the tax rate, pushing down its
values at Nash equilibrium.
Finally notice that if retail and wholesale net prices coincide, pw = p and


















2.2 Consolidation and Formulary Apportionment
Moving one to Consolidation and Formulary Apportionment, C&FA, a con-
solidated tax base B is ﬁrst calculated, using equation (2) and canceling out
intra-MJE ﬂows. This is then distributed, or apportioned, between the two
jurisdictions using a formula which is determined cooperatively by the two
jurisdictions at Step 4 of the game.
We suppose here that the formula is a linear combination of real in-
vestment (or here equivalently production or labor cost) and gross receipts
from ﬁnal sales, with weights λ and 1 − λ respectively. Since wage costs are
strictly proportional to investment in this model, the wage costs criterion
can be disregarded. What is important for the purposes of this paper is that
the distribution of one criterion - here real investment - is under the ﬁrm’s
control, and the distribution of the other is not. It turns out that that there







i =[ λα +( 1− λ)q]B
B
FA
j =[ λ(1 − α)+( 1− λ)(1− q)]B
or rearranging,
Bi =[ q(1 − λ)+αλ]
p
r
Bj =[ ( 1 − q)(1− λ) − αλ]
p
r
which sets forth the relative emphasis of sales, q, and investment and thus
production, α6.
At Step 5 the jurisdictions may begin a new round of tax competition
and at Step 6 the MJE revises its distribution of investment. Again we will
look at the game backward, from Step 6 to Step 4. In some sense, steps 4
and 5 correspond to the present situation in the EU; in the analysis they are
assumed to occur simultaneously.
2.2.1 The MJE under C&FA
Substituting the last two lines of equation (9) for equation (2) into equation
(1), we ﬁnd that equations (4) and (5) are replaced by
α











(1 − λ)q + λα



















Ac o m p a r i s o no fλp and pw will then determine the sensitivity of real
investment to tax diﬀerential: the sensitivity to tax rates (in absolute value)
is higher under C&FA if λp > pw.



















(1 − λ)(1− q) − λ
µ


















2.2.2 The jurisdictions under C&FA, possible tax competition
We are now at Step 5 of the game. As in Step 6, suppose that the formula is
characterized by parameter λ. Then each government selects its corporate tax










































j ∝ (1 − λ)(2q − 1) + λ(2α0 − 1)
and the tax rate in jurisdiction j will be smaller if (1 − λ)(2q − 1)+λ(2α0 − 1) >
0. Though a suﬃcient condition for that inequality to hold is α0,q > 1/2
- a condition compatible with that α0 >q>1/2 stated above -, it is in-
t e r e s t i n gt on o t et h a tf o rt h ee x t r e m ev a l u e so fλ we have q>1/2( λ =0 )
and α0 > 1/2( λ =1 ) : again the poorer jurisdiction is the more aggressive.
Notice also that parameters are deemed to be such that tax rates are smaller
than unity.
13However a key issue is: does the reform increase or decrease tax competi-
tion, or, more precisely, if the governments revise their tax rates solely in the
best interests of their residents, will higher or lower rates of taxation result
under C&FA than under SA? To answer this question, let us compare the
reaction function above with its counterpart under SA, equation (8). That
comparison immediately reveals that the slope is identical while the intercept















w − λp) > 0 (15)
The ﬁrst term of this expression - that in brackets in the right hand side
- is positive since, as already mentioned, we assume that
(λα0 +( 1− λ)q)γr(u − s) − w>0
in order to guarantee that the intercept is positive so that the tax rates at
Nash equilibrium are positive too. As a consequence, the inequality will hold
if the last term is also positive - i.e. if pw >λ p- which is the condition for
the investment being less sensitive to tax changes after the reform.
Therefore, if the reform makes the MJE less sensitive to tax changes it will
push the intercept of the reaction function upward and thus tax competition
will decrease, or tax rates will increase. Conversely, if pw <λ p- i.e. if
the reform makes the MJE more sensitive to tax changes - tax competition
will be boosted. Considering the extreme cases, if λ =1and pw <p ,t a x
competition is sharply increased: indeed in this situation the distribution of
the tax base depends entirely on the distribution of real investment, which is
t h ev a r i a b l ec o n t r o l l e db yt h eM J E .T h u st h er e f o r mi n c r e a s e st h ei m p o r t a n c e
of the variable controlled by the ﬁrm in the determination of its tax liabilities,
and the MJE gains in terms of freedom with respect to the tax authorities.
Unlike that, if λ =0 , the tax competition does not increase.
This discussion can be summed up in the following condition for no further
tax competition,
Proposition 1 (No-further-tax-competition) In a two-jurisdiction and one-
degree mobile MJE setting a suﬃcient condition for τFA
h ≥ τ
q
h, h = i,j,i s
λp < pw.
Finally it is possible that revising the tax rates upwards would not be
politically feasible.
142.2.3 Adopting C&FA at unanimity
Given the above deﬁnition of the consolidated tax base and the apportion-
ment formula, as well as of the social welfare functions, the two jurisdictions
jointly maximize W = Wi + Wj with respect to λ in Step 4. However the
reform will only be adopted if WFA− Wq ≥ 0 - remember that unanimity
rule prevails in tax matters in Europe. This participation constraint ensures
that a side payment will be made, if necessary, by the jurisdiction which
stands to gain from the reform to that which stands to loose. To keep the
problem tractable, we assume that Steps 4 and 5 are performed simultane-
ously: the jurisdictions deciding jointly on the reform and simultaneously,
but separately, on the tax rates.
























and the second order one
d2W
dλ










From the ﬁrst order condition the equilibrium value of the apportionment














j determined at Step 5 above. Then, substituting the right
hand side of equation (14) for τFA
i − τFA






¶2 1 − 2q
α0 − q
(18)
which needs to be comprised between 0 and 1. Thus, especially if α0 >
q>1/2, the realistic case where the smaller jurisdiction is more aggressive
in terms of tax rates, the numerator of equation (18) is negative and the
equilibrium value of λ is zero: the consolidated tax base is distributed among
t h et w oj u r i s d i c t i o n si nl i n ew i t ht h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fs a l e s ,t h ev a r i a b l en o t











W > 1 (19)
It turns out that the cooperatively determined equilibrium formula λ
WW










which certainly holds if α0 >q>1/2 since then λ
WW =0 . However it also
hold for a relatively large range of positive values of λ
WW.7
To sum up,
Proposition 2 The cooperatively determined equilibrium formula λ
WW is
compatible with the no-further-tax-competition condition if inequality (20)
holds, which will be certainly the case if α0 >q>1/2.
However the reform will only be adopted if WFA−Wq ≥ 0.T h e nt h et w o
jurisdictions, considered together, experiment an aggregate welfare gain and
a side payment is possible from that which individually experiments a welfare
gain (the higher taxing jurisdiction actually) to that which loses individual
welfare.































For that purpose we proceed in two steps. First, we assume that the no-
further-tax-competition condition holds, that conditions are fulﬁlled for τj −
τi < 0 and that, tentatively, it is not politically feasible to increase tax rates
after the reform. In that framework we show that there is an aggregate
welfare gain; this is lemma 3. Then we relax that last restriction and show




p means that in Bi the relative weight given to sales with respect
to investment or production is increased - see the footnotes above.
16Lemma 3 If the no-further-tax-competition condition holds, τj−τi < 0 and
tax rates are not permitted to increase after the reform, a move to C&FA
characterized by λ
WW is aggregate welfare increasing provided that real in-
vestment is "enough mobile".
The condition WFA− Wq ≥ 0 implies that
½
(u − 2s)(τi − τj)
∙
















where the last term is negative if the no-further-tax-competition condition
holds. The inequality holds if the expression between brackets is negative
too. In the brackets, the second term is obviously negative, while the ﬁrst
o n ei si f






Since τj − τi < 0,as u ﬃcient condition for the inequality to hold is that
either













which means either αFA− q<0 or αq − q<0: real investment is "enough
mobile" to generate in Step 3 or in Step 6 of the game α<qalthough initially
α0 >q- see the deﬁnition of "enough mobile" given above.
Lemma 4 If the no-further-tax-competition condition holds, τj−τi < 0 and
t h em o v et oC & F Ac h a r a c t e r i z e db yλ
WW, then further increase in tax rates
is aggregate welfare increasing.
















172.3 Tentative conclusion and illustration (I)
We can conclude, tentatively, that the move from SA to C&FA is aggregate
welfare improving provided that the reform and formula are decided cooper-
atively in the joint best interest of the jurisdictions concerned; that formula
will be characterized by a parameter λ
WW compatible with a no-further-tax-
competition condition. Such a condition involves that the formula emphasizes
criteria that the MJE can not easily manipulate and ensures that the reform
will not boost tax competition. Therefore the choice of the formula is a key
decision for the operation and the future of the system.
More formally, we can state
Proposition 5 : In a two-jurisdiction - one-degree mobile MJE setting,
where the MJE is "enough mobile", ∃λ
WW ∈ [0,1] s.t. (1) λ
WW =a r gm a xW =
Wi+Wj ,( 2 )∆W>0 and the reform is adopted unanimously provided that
side payments are possible, and (3) τFA
h ≥ τ
q
h , h = i,j so that, if it is
adopted unanimously, the reform does not boost tax competition. Especially,
when α0 >q>1/2, (τi − τi < 0), for sure (1), (2) and (3) are compatible;
then λ
WW =0 .
To highlight that conclusion, suppose that jurisdiction i is an old member
state of the European Union and jurisdiction j a new member state. Initial
production and larger market share are located in i;p r o d u c t i o ni sm o b i l e
but market share is not, or at least is less mobile. Corporate tax rate is
smaller in the new member state than in the larger. The move from SA
to C&FA will be welfare increasing for the two Member States considered
together and no risk of further tax competition will appear, if the reform
is adopted cooperatively with a formula which emphasizes the distribution
of market shares, thus of sales on a destination principle8. Then, the old
member state will individually gain in terms of social welfare and the new
one will individually lose; however a side payment will be made from the old
to the new member state. The no-further-tax-competition does not preclude
tax competition at all; on the contrary the reform makes sense only if there
is enough mobility of real investment and in particular if the production is
extensively relocated in j after its adhesion to the EU, which is characterized
by α<qwhile initially α0 >q .
8If λ
WW =0the C&FA is actually a tax on sales based on the destination principle.
This is in line with the more general observation that using C&FA means taxing the
factors behind the formula.
18In that example, emphasizing the distribution of sales both reduces the
freedom of the MJE and forces it to pay the larger amount of taxes in the
high tax jurisdiction; thus there are two arguments in favour λ =0 . If, unlike
that, the market share is larger in the new member state, then the optimal
formula is characterized by a positive value of the parameter λ. However
that parameter will have to fulﬁll the no-further-tax-competition condition.
Incidentally it is worth noticing that if both governments are Leviathan,
the equilibrium formula will put more emphasis on sales since the authorities
are less committed with respect to the welfare of the shareholders, whose
best interest is to have a formula which favors the mobility of the ﬁrm, thus
which emphasizes criteria that the MJE controls like the distribution of its
investment and operation.
Now we will see if these results hold when more sophisticated strategies
are permitted to the MJE.
3 A two-degree mobile MJE
In this section we assume that the MJE controls more than a single variable,
in fact we assume it controls two variables. In Section 3.1 the additional
variable under the control of the MJE is the origin of sales: the MJE is
no longer bound to deliver q in jurisdiction i through its aﬃliate in that
jurisdiction; instead it can decide to deliver a fraction ν of its output from
the aﬃliate in i to customers in both jurisdictions and to do so independent
of the place of production of its output. Therefore the MJE controls two
variables α and ν.T h eu s eo fav a l u eo fν diﬀerent from q and α is a way of
shifting taxable proﬁts from one jurisdiction to another.
In Section 3.2, a third and lowest tax rate jurisdiction is introduced. The
MJE may use a passive aﬃliate in that jurisdiction to ensure that as much
as possible of its tax base is taxed in that jurisdiction. The MJE ﬁnances its
real investment using funds partly channeled through the third jurisdiction
and possibly converted from one type of ﬁnance to another - actually from
shares to loan - there. Conversely, income from real activities is partly chan-
neled through the aﬃliate in the passive jurisdiction, possibly taxed there
and then turned from interest into dividends; these latter beneﬁtf r o mt h e
application of the exemption principle in the jurisdiction of residence of the
parent company (as mentioned above we assume that all the jurisdictions are
located within the EU).
19In this section we assume that the set of jurisdictions forming the consol-
idating area coincides with the set of all jurisdictions; in that set the decision
to adopt the reform is assumed to be taken unanimously. Unlike that, in
Section 4, we will reconsider Section 3.2 to investigate what happens if the
reform is only considered for adoption by the two active jurisdictions; then
one jurisdiction remains outside the consolidating area.
In both Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, and in the sequel of the paper as well,
we will pay attention to an important incentive compatibility constraint: tax
shifting opportunities are only used by the MJE if they increase its value.
3.1 Tax shifting and paper proﬁt, a two-jurisdiction
case
Suppose that the MJE can decide not only on the distribution of its real
investment, but also on the places where proﬁts are reported. In other words,
the assumption that in a given jurisdiction, say i, it is taxed on the sales to
ﬁnal consumers q plus the sales to the other aﬃliate of the group α − q
is relaxed. Instead it can sell to consumers in any jurisdiction through its
aﬃliate in the local or foreign jurisdiction. Let ν the fraction of the MJE
production sold from the entity in i.B o t hα and ν are now decision variables
for the MJE which, formally, will consider moving from
MJE0 =( α0,q,q) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] × [0,1]
to
MJE =( α,ν,q) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] × [0,1]
to maximize its value V .
3.1.1 Under SA
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20in jurisdictions i and j respectively, with α and ν b e i n gt h et w ov a r i a b l e s
under the control of the ﬁrm. Selection of ν smaller than q generates an










This is called a “paper proﬁt” because it is not based on any real decision.
We assume that pursuing paper proﬁt has a cost - think of the risk that
t h eo p e r a t i o ni sr e j e c t e db yt h et a xa u t h o r i t i e so nt h eb a s i st h a ti th a sn o





2 ,β< γ (23)
This cost is, however, smaller than that of moving real investment.
L e tu st h e nr e c o n s i d e rS t e p s2a n d3o ft h eg a m e .
At Step 3, maximizing the value of the ﬁrm w.r.t. the two variables under
its control provides us with the equilibrium values,
α






- which is formally unchanged - and








































































At Step 2, governments, maximizing the social welfare of their residents
will now take into account the incentive compatibility constraint V ν ≥ V q
21through a Lagrange multiplier µ with µ =0- Case 1 (unconstrained) when
the incentive compatibility constraint is not bounded - and µ>0 -C a s e2
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Under Case 1 (unconstrained), µ =0and equation (27) reduces to an
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I tc a nb es h o w nt h a tt h ei n t e r c e p to fe q u a t i o n( 2 8 )i ss m a l l e rt h a nt h ei n t e r -
cept of equation (8) so that the race to the bottom is expected to be stronger
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2 < 1 (30)
Then τν
h < 1,h = i,j. Using equations (4) and (24), the investment in
jurisdiction i is
α










which departs less from from α0 than under a single degree of MJE mobility,
αq.
It turns out that a two-degree mobile MJE invests less in the low tax
jurisdiction, substituting a less costly paper proﬁt for a costly move of real
investment.
9From the ﬁrst derivative of L = Wν − µ(V q − V ν) w.r.t. τi.
22Since both the equilibrium tax rates and the costs of optimizing the loca-
tion of the production and that of sales are smaller than in Section 2 above,
the incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed. Therefore Case 2 (con-
strained) does not need to be investigated.
Finally, in terms of social welfare, this situation is worse than that of









































































3.1.2 Move to C&FA
Should the tax system then moves to C&FA, what will the eﬀect be on the
value and behavior of the ﬁrm, the apportionment formula and social welfare,
and the possible tax competition?
In fact the reform generates the same outcomes as under Section 2.2
above: paper proﬁt disappears and the MJE loses the additional value they
possibly provided. Unlike the ﬁrm, the governments will now recoup the
corresponding revenue loss: they jointly gain from the reform, and the gain
may be larger than in the previous setting.
Two results deserve our attention, they are summarized in the proposition
thereafter
Proposition 6 Compared to a two-jurisdiction - one-degree mobile MJE set-
ting, in a two-jurisdiction - two-degree mobile MJE setting, where the MJE is
"enough mobile", (1) the no-further-tax-competition condition is less severe
and (2) the aggregate welfare gain involved by the move from SA to C&FA is
larger .
The ﬁrst part of the proposition comes from the observation that λp < pw
is a suﬃcient condition for τFA
h ≥ τ
q




fortiori as u ﬃcient condition for τFA
h ≥ τ
q
h. Moreover, now, it is possible to
23have the no-further-tax-competition condition holding for values of λ>p w/p.
The second part of the proposition is based on equation (32): since under
the conditions derived at Section 2, WFA >W q,t h e nWq >W ν implies
WFA− Wν >W FA− Wq.
3.2 Proﬁtable detour through a third jurisdiction
S of a rw eh a v el i m i t e dt h ee c o n o m yt ot w oj u r i s d i c t i o n s .W ew i l ln o wi n t r o -
d u c eat h i r do n e .A m o n gt h o s ej u r i s d i c t i o n s ,t w oa r es a i dt ob ea c t i v eb e c a u s e
the MJE has or can have active entities producing goods and services on their
territory or selling them from their territory. This is the situations of jurisdic-
tions i and j already considered. The additional jurisdiction k is said passive.
It oﬀers the lowest tax rate, τk < min(τi,τj), and is only used for the pur-
poses of the taxation of income, through a lucrative detour and intermodal
ﬁnancing. Notice that k can be a speciﬁc legal or geographical space located
within either i or j. Nevertheless, jurisdiction k is not considered by i and j
as a tax heaven. This assumption, in line with EU practice provided that k
belongs to the EU, is important; if it did not hold, beneﬁts repatriated from
k to the parent jurisdiction would not beneﬁt of the exemption mechanism
deemed to be at work in that economy.
Proﬁts from both active entities, up to a fraction c,a r ec h a n n e l e dt o
jurisdiction k to be taxed there - due to the necessity of avoiding thin cap-
italization, that strategy is limited to a fraction c of the investment (we
deliberately use the same letter as in Mintz and Smart, 2004, who allow for
a similar phenomenon). We assume that using intermodal ﬁnancing and the
lucrative detour has a cost; however to avoid unnecessary complication in
the exposition, we suppose that cost such that
c(c)=0 ,c ≤ ci = cj
→∞ ,c > ci = cj (33)
where ci,cj stand for the upper bound to the indebtedness of the local aﬃli-
ates; beyond those threshold, interest is considered as a hidden dividend and
is no longer deductible against the tax base in the paying jurisdiction.
More formally, the MJE considers moving the structure of its ﬁnancing
and location of the bulk of its tax base from
MJE0 =( α0,0,q) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] × [0,1]
24to
MJE =( α,c,q) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] × [0,1]
in order to maximize its value V .
3.2.1 Under Separate Accounting
The tax bases in the three jurisdictions are respectively, from equation (2)
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c
























Now, at Step 3 of the game, maximizing the value of the MJE provides a
new expression for the fraction of the real investment in i
α







with c = ci = cj.
Comparing equation (35) with equation (5) we immediately see that the
sensitivity of the investment location is reduced, and is in fact limited to
the fraction not taxed in the active entities. In the extreme case where the
ﬁnancing through a loan from k has no upper limit, the MJE will not relocate
its real investment for tax purposes. The reasoning for the MJE is simple:
why to undertake a costly real investment relocation when a free tax shifting
opportunity exists?
At Step 2, we need again to introduce the incentive compatibility con-
straint explicitly10, and then to make the same distinction as above. Now
the Lagrange multiplier µ vanishes if τc
i is such that V c ≥ V q and is positive
otherwise. We also require as previously that 0 <τ c
i < 1.
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10The Lagrangian is L = Wc − µ(V q − V c).
25Case 1. Suppose ﬁrst that the constraint is not bounded. Then µ =0 .
That case is in line with the way we have treated Step 2 so far and the


















Comparing equations (37) and (8), we see that tax competition is less
severe in the present setting: the intercept is higher and so are the values of
the tax rates at Nash equilibrium.



























Therefore the distribution of the location of investment and production is
unaﬀected although the place where income is taxed is aﬀected.
However, two problems arise then. First though τ
q
h < 1,t h e r ei sn o
guarantee that τ
q
h/(1 − c) will be.
Second, if the tax rates are determined by reaction functions like equa-
tion (37), the tax liabilities of the MJE w.r.t. the two active jurisdictions





hBh; but then the MJE has to pay taxes to jurisdiction k too -
except if τk =0-, so that it has no incentive to channel funds through that
jurisdiction. This means that the active jurisdictions have fully anticipated
the outﬂow of tax base and corrected accordingly the tax rates, but then
the incentive compatibility constraint is not satisﬁed and the problem under
investigation loses its relevance. We can also regard that case as one of sym-
metric information: the tax authorities of the active jurisdictions know that
the MJE considers tax shifting through the detour.
Due to the observations above, the tax rates need to be reduced by a
factor h,w i t h0 <h<1 and the investigation of Case 2 is relavant.
Case 2. Suppose now that the incentive compatibility constraint is bounded.
The overall tax liabilities of the ﬁrm are actually reduced and the equilibrium
26tax rates are smaller than in Case 1. Among the values of the tax rates in




assuming h =1−c. In that case the incentive compatibility constraint is sat-
isﬁed and µ>0. That case means assuming asymmetric information:t h e
tax authorities of the active jurisdiction do not know that the MJE consid-
ers the tax shifting opportunity or, equivalently, they cannot push up their
corporate tax rates despite the new information that a proﬁtable detour is
possible, e.g. because the same corporate tax rate is also used for taxing
domestic ﬁrms. In that case,
α










which departs less from initial position α0.
3.2.2 C&FA applied by the three jurisdictions
The ﬁrst and main implication of the adoption of C&FA by all three jurisdic-
tions is that c vanishes since the inﬂow in the entity located in k is cancelled
by the corresponding outﬂow. Then c =0under C&FA and the distribution
of investment between the two active jurisdictions is again given by equation
(10). Thus the maximization of the value of the MJE at Step 6 leaves us
again with
α





And again, from Step 5, the equilibrium tax rates obey the reaction func-



















to be compared with equation (37) - Case 1 - or (8) - Case 2 - to determine
as u ﬃcient no-further-tax-competition condition. In the former case, that
condition is now
λp < (1 − c)p
w
less likely to be fulﬁlled than its counterpart in the latter case,
λp < p
w
27as previously. Especially, if c is close to unity - no thin capitalization rule
in either i or j -, the simplest way to satisfy that condition will be to set
λ equal to 0; however thin capitalization are under the authority of local
jurisdictions.
Finally, at Step 4, we determine the equilibrium value of λ, again provided
by equations (18) and (19).














































Then high tax jurisdiction j will gain social welfare and will be able to oﬀset
both jurisdictions i and k; indeed, by losing its revenue, that latter loses all
its welfare since nothing is produced nor sold on its territory.
Consider the two cases examined above. In Case 1 - τc
h = τ
q
h/(1 − c) -







less severe than previously - WFA − Wq > 0 - the right hand side of the
inequality corresponding to the gain of value of the MJE no longer compelled
to pay tax to its passive low tax entity; that result sets forth the lack of
relevance of that Case 1 since then the MJE had no incentive to decide for
the detour.
In Case 2 - especially τc
h = τ
q
h - , that condition becomes
W
FA− W
















where the term between brackets in the right hand side of the inequality












:t h ea c t i v e
jurisdictions, by eliminating the eﬀect of the detour on their tax bases, get
back the revenues previously lost in favor of jurisdiction k; despite they have
to transfer revenue to jurisdiction k to compensate its own tax revenue loss,
some surplus revenue remains their.
It turns out that, deﬁning J as the set of jurisdictions and A as the set
of jurisdictions participating to the consolidating area,
28Proposition 7 : In a three-jurisdiction - two-degree mobile MJE setting,
where the MJE is "enough mobile" and where A = J, ∃λ
WW ∈ [0,1] s.t.
(1) λ
WW =a r gm a xW = Wi + Wj given Wc
k ,( 2 )∆W>0 and the reform
is adopted unanimously provided that side payments are possible, and (3)
τFA
h ≥ τc
h , h = i,j so that, if it is adopted unanimously, the reform does not
boost tax competition. Especially, when α0 >q>1/2, (τi −τi < 0),f o rs u r e
(1), (2) and (3) are compatible; then λ
WW =0 .
3.3 Tentative conclusion and illustration (II)
Section 3.1 shows that an increased freedom of the MJE with respect to tax
authorities, within a given geographic area, allowing it to set up tax shifting
and paper proﬁt strategies, provides us with a further argument in favor of
adopting C&FA. We have limited the investigation to a single such strategy
but it could be repeated with other ones like the determination of the size of
transfer prices or of the level of royalties and various kinds of management
fees.
Section 3.2 allows us to look at situations like the adoption of C&FA in
a heterogeneous federation in terms of corporate tax rates. This is actually
t h ec a s ei nt h eE Uw h e r et h o s er a t e sc a nb ea ss m a l la s1 2 . 5p e rc e n ti n
I r e l a n d ,a n de v e nl e s si nB e l g i a nC o o r d i n a t i o nC e n t r e s ,a n da sh i g ha s3 8
per cent in Germany (IFS data for 2005). We have shown that the reform
can be aggregate welfare increasing in such a setting enabling jurisdictions
which gain welfare to compensate those who lose, including ﬁnancial centres,
through side payments. Especially, in the asymmetric case 2, by eliminating
the eﬀect of the detour on their tax bases, the active jurisdictions get back
the revenues previously lost in favor of jurisdiction k; since their tax rates
are higher, that allows them to transfer enough revenue to jurisdiction k to
compensate that jurisdiction’s loss of tax revenue.
4 A sub- or open federation
In Section 3.2 above we assumed that the three jurisdictions adopted the re-
form together. Now let us imagine that only two of them, the two active ones,
decide to introduce the reform, forming a Sub-Federation, while jurisdiction
k decides to stay outside the consolidating area.
29Such a situation is possible in the EU if the two active jurisdictions de-
cide to nest their joint decision within an Enhanced Cooperation Agreement
(Bordignon and Busco, 2006).
This is also the case if the Federation is open to the rest of the world; then
we need to reinterpret jurisdiction k of Section 3.2 as the rest of the world,
assuming however that ﬁscal relations with that rest of the world are ruled
by an actual application of the exemption principle. We will see however
that reconsidering the use of the exemption principle can be a useful tax
base protection device for the consolidating area.
4.1 Enhanced Cooperation between the active juris-
dictions
Suppose now that jurisdictions i and j decide to implement C&FA, while k
remains outside the consolidating area. Then the tax bases respectively are
Bi =[ λα +( 1− λ)q](1− c)
p
r







and, at Step 6, the ﬁrm decides for
α







In Step 5, the determination of the tax rates requires the use of a La-
gragian and the same distinction as above between a Case 1 and a Case
2.
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30whose intercept is larger than if the reform had been adopted unanimously,
at least for identical values of λ.T h e n τ
FA2/3
h = τFA
h /(1 − c) which means
that tax competition is less likely to appear than in the situation investi-
gated in Section 3.2, a result which parallels the attenuation of tax com-




h /(1 − c) with τc
h = τ
q
h/(1 − c) involves that the no further tax
competition condition is now the same as in the one-degree mobile MJE set-
ting, λp < pw, obtained from a comparison of equations (37) and (44). Then
αFA2/3 = αq and the reform has no eﬀect on the real decision of the MJE.
Finally λ
W is determined at Step 4 as previously and the same condition as
in Section 2 applies for the adoption of the reform, by the three consolidating
jurisdictions, unanimously. However the same two problems as under Section
3.2. arise; there is no guarantee that τ
FA2/3
h is not larger than one and the
incentive compatibility constraint is not satisﬁed.
Case 2. Therefore let us reduce τ
FA2/3
h with a factor h such that 0 <h<1
and consider especially h =1−c.T h e nτ
FA2/3
h = τFA




The no-further-tax-competition is again λp < pw,a n dαFA2/3 is determined
by equation (42) accordingly. Finally λ
W is decided cooperatively by the two




q > 0 (45)
That condition is more demanding than the corresponding one (40) since the
active jurisdictions no longer get back the proﬁt shifted by the MJE to its
passive entity.
4.2 Tax base protection in the consolidating area
Let us focus on Case 2. The adoption of the reform either within a Sub-
Federation, e.g. through an Enhanced Cooperation Agreement within the
EU, rather than by the whole Federation, or within an open Federation,
i.e. a Federation which does not exhaust the entire economy, formally in a
framework characterized by A = {i,j} ⊂ J = {i,j,k}, implies a loss of tax




















The consolidating area could recoup that revenue loss by simultaneously
adopting another tax reform. That latter consists to give up the exemption
31principle w.r.t. dividends coming from entities located in jurisdictions outside
the consolidating area and to adopt instead the crediting principle - see the
US system where crediting applies to dividends from outside the US. Then,
at given tax rates in the consolidating area, the MJE has no longer incentive
to channel its income through the passive entity k.
To face the possibility that the MJE decides not for channelling through
k but for accumulating income in that aﬃliate, used as the instrument for
ﬁnancing further investment anywhere in the economy, the move to crediting
could be accompanied by the adoption of a measure allowing the consolidat-
i n ga r e at ol e v yt a xo np r o ﬁts located outside its territory, with a credit for
local tax. Such measure often exists in anti-cfc legislations. Termed outside,
that measure means extending the consolidated tax base to worldwide proﬁts
of the MJE wherever they are located, within or outside entities participating
to the consolidating area, and irrespective whether or not they are repatri-
ated to the consolidating area; and to give a credit for taxes paid outside the
consolidating area.
4.3 Tentative conclusion and illustration (III)
Given the analysis conducted so far in this Section, it turns out that
Proposition 8 : Proposition 7 also holds in a three-jurisdiction - two-degree
mobile MJE setting, where the MJE is "enough mobile" and where A =
{i,j} ⊂ J = {i,j,k}, if the consolidating area, when moving from SA to
C&FA, completes the reform by giving up the exemption principle for divi-
dends coming from outside the area, adopting instead the crediting principle,
and extending its application to proﬁts not repatriated to entities belonging
to the consolidating area.
To illustrate imagine that the founding members of the European Union
and maybe some other countries, would like to go ahead with EU integration
and to adopt C&FA within an Enhanced Cooperation Agreement. Proposi-
tion 8 suggests that when they move to C&FA, those countries simultaneously
replace the exemption mechanism by the crediting one for foreign dividends
and repatriated proﬁts, what is permitted by the European Directive on cross
border dividends between parent companies, and extend taxation and credit-
i n gt on o n - r e p a t r i a t e dp r o ﬁts; that last measure can take the form of taxing
accrued capital gains with a credit for the tax levied abroad on the upstream
proﬁt.
325C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have investigated a move from Separate Accounting to
Consolidation and Formulary Apportionment, with the reform suggested by
the EU Commission in 2001 especially in mind. In this exercise we have
focused the investigation on two related issues, the choice of the formula and
the composition of the consolidating area — either the entire EU or some
Member States within an Enhanced Cooperation Agreement —, and their
impact on social welfare and tax competition.
In Section 2 we considered a one-degree mobile MJE allowed to decide on
the location of its investments and production plants, and two jurisdictions
where that MJE might be active. In that setting we developed a six-step
game which in some sense parallels the development of the European Union.
The ﬁrst three steps correspond to the pre-reform period, the last three to
today’s situation, with the jurisdictions deciding cooperatively whether or
not to adopt the reform, and deciding non-cooperatively on the tax rates
they will apply after its implementation.
In this context we derived the range of values of the apportionment for-
mula consistent with no further development of tax competition after the
adoption of the reform and checked that its application actually increased
the social welfare of the consolidation area, allowing the winning jurisdiction
to oﬀset the losses of the losing through a side payment.
Thereafter we reconsidered those results in more sophisticated cases. In
Section 3, we allowed the MJE to be two-degree mobile, also being permitted
either to decide on the origin of its sales or to use an intermodal ﬁnancing
strategy and proﬁtable detours for its ﬂows of funds. In the latter case we
introduced a third and passive jurisdiction, assuming that that jurisdiction
needs to join the consolidating area in case of adoption of the reform.
In Section 4 we discussed the adoption of the reform by a Sub-Federation,
a subset of EU Member States through anE n h a n c e dC o o p e r a t i o nA g r e e m e n t
mechanism, or by a open Federation. This situation is of especially inter-
est, since it corresponds to a possible device within the EU and also to the
relationship between an EU-wide consolidating area and the rest of the world.
Our tentative policy conclusion is that the reform should be supported
provided that (1) the formula puts emphasis on criteria that the MJE can not
easily manipulate; (2) real investment is enough mobile; (3) the consolidation
is made compulsory within the consolidating area; and (4) the consolidat-
ing area protects its capacity to actually levy taxes by adopting a crediting
33system, possibly extended to accrued capital gains, vis-à-vis the rest of the
world. This ﬁnal recommendation is valid even if the reform is adopted by
the entire EU, as long as the EU remain connected to the rest of the world.
This paper paves the way for further research on coalitions and decision
mechanisms within a bottom-up federation in progress, as well as the study
of the consequences of tax policy changes by a group of jurisdictions sharing
private actors, such as MJE’s, with the rest of the world.
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